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SLINGbotBotnets are large networks of bots (compromised machines) that are under the control of a
small number of bot masters. They pose a signiﬁcant threat to Internet’s communications
and applications. A botnet relies on command and control (C2) communications channels traf-
ﬁc between its members for its attack execution. C2 trafﬁc occurs prior to any attack; hence, the
detection of botnet’s C2 trafﬁc enables the detection of members of the botnet before any real
harm happens. We analyze C2 trafﬁc and ﬁnd that it exhibits a periodic behavior. This is due to
the pre-programmed behavior of bots that check for updates to download them every T sec-
onds. We exploit this periodic behavior to detect C2 trafﬁc. The detection involves evaluating
the periodogram of the monitored trafﬁc. Then applying Walker’s large sample test to the peri-
odogram’s maximum ordinate in order to determine if it is due to a periodic component or not.
If the periodogram of the monitored trafﬁc contains a periodic component, then it is highly
likely that it is due to a bot’s C2 trafﬁc. The test looks only at aggregate control plane trafﬁc
behavior, which makes it more scalable than techniques that involve deep packet inspection
(DPI) or tracking the communication ﬂows of different hosts. We apply the test to two types
of botnet, tinyP2P and IRC that are generated by SLINGbot. We verify the periodic behavior
of their C2 trafﬁc and compare it to the results we get on real trafﬁc that is obtained from a
secured enterprise network. We further study the characteristics of the test in the presence of
injected HTTP background trafﬁc and the effect of the duty cycle on the periodic behavior.
ª 2013 Production and hosting by Elsevier B.V. on behalf of Cairo University.Introduction
Botnets are large networks of bots (compromised machines)
that are under the control of a small number of bot masters.In recent years, the threat posed by botnets toward Internet
applications and communications has escalated. This is due
to the fact that a bot master controls a large number of bots
that ranges from hundreds of thousands to millions. This
magniﬁes the impact of well-known network malicious activi-
ties such as scanning, E-mail spam and distributed denial-
of-service (DDoS) attacks. Moreover, botnets increase the
effectiveness of phishing, click fraud, identity theft, and
espionage.
Due to the destructive capabilities of botnets, they have be-
come a major threat to economy, information, and communi-
cation infrastructures. The Federal Bureau of Investigation
(FBI) in the United States, in an initiative to detect bot masters
436 B. AsSadhan and J.M.F. Mouraand take them apart has identiﬁed over 1 million victim com-
puters [1,2]. Many people have been indicted, pleaded guilty,
or been sentenced for crimes related to botnet usage [1,2].
What increases the impact of the problem is that the majority
of the owners of the compromised machines are not aware that
their machines are a member of a botnet [1]. According to the
April 2013 Symantec Internet Security Threat Report, Volume
18, 3.4 million distinct bot-infected computers were observed
in 2012 [3]. According to the same report, botnets were respon-
sible for about 69% of spam E-mail in 2012 [3]. The good
news; there is a decrease in these numbers over the past years.
For example, in 2009, there were 6.08 million distinct bot-in-
fected computers and botnets were responsible for about
85% of spam E-mail [4]. Nevertheless, the numbers are still
high; moreover, bot masters have begun linking mobile smart
phones to form botnets of mobile devices to make monetary
proﬁts [3].
Botnets’ trafﬁc is different from the trafﬁc of other types of
malware in that it includes command and control (C2) com-
munication channels trafﬁc. A bot master relies on these chan-
nels to send commands to the members of its botnet to execute
attack activities. In addition, a bot master relies on these chan-
nels to control botnet members to obtain the needed informa-
tion and code to run their attacks. C2 communication channels
trafﬁc occurs before the execution of attack activities and can
be considered as the intelligence communication between the
different members of a botnet. This makes the detection of
C2 communication channels trafﬁc of interest as it means
detecting bots before any targeted victim is attacked.
The detection of C2 trafﬁc is difﬁcult due to several reasons
that was pointed out by AsSadhan et. al [5]. They include the
following: (1) the low volume of C2 trafﬁc; (2) C2’s trafﬁc is
well behaved and does not violate any network protocol rules;
(3) there may be only a few number of botnet members in the
monitored network; and (4) the C2 trafﬁc might be encrypted
[5]. To tackle these difﬁculties, we look at one behavior that
we, along with other researchers, observed in C2 trafﬁc [5–7].
The behavior we observe is spatial-temporal correlation and
similarities in the C2 communication trafﬁc of the bots belong-
ing to the same botnet.
In our work, we focus on temporal correlation in a single
bot’s trafﬁc. We ﬁnd that a bot’s C2 trafﬁc exhibits periodic
behavior. This is due to the nature of the pre-programmed
behavior of a bot, where in many variations of botnets each
bot frequently contacts other bots every T seconds. This pre-
programmed behavior is present in botnets with different
structures and communication protocols and is done in order
for bots to update their data, receive commands, and send
keep-alive messages. We note that the periodic behavior is
observed when looking at the trafﬁc of the transport port num-
ber used by the bot for its C2 communication.
As a result, the detection of periodic behavior in a
machine’s trafﬁc might be an indication that the machine is
a member of a botnet. We exploit this observation in order
to detect bots by detecting periodic behavior in the trafﬁc of
the network we monitor. To achieve this we present in this
paper an efﬁcient method to detect periodic behavior in botnet
command and control trafﬁc. The method is based on the eval-
uation of the trafﬁc sequence’s periodogram. A periodogram is
used to view a periodic signal in the frequency domain to
observe the peak located at the fundamental frequency of the
signal. After the peak is located, we apply Walker’s largesample test to decide whether or not the peak is signiﬁcant en-
ough compared to the rest of the periodogram’s ordinates. In
case the peak is signiﬁcant, we declare that it is due to a peri-
odic component with the frequency where the peak is located.
To increase the efﬁciency of the method further, we decom-
pose enterprise LAN TCP trafﬁc into control and data planes
[8], and use the control plane trafﬁc as a surrogate for the
whole trafﬁc (control and data planes combined). This is
because data trafﬁc generation is based on control trafﬁc gen-
eration, which makes the behavior of the two trafﬁc groups
similar [8].
The rest of the paper is organized as follows, Section ‘‘Back-
ground and motivation: Detection of periodic behavior in bot-
net C2 communication channels trafﬁc’’ reviews the command
and control (C2) trafﬁc of botnets and proposes how to detect
botnets. Section ‘‘Approach: Discrete time series analysis of
aggregate trafﬁc’’ explains how we aggregate network trafﬁc
and decompose them into control and data planes trafﬁc. Sec-
tion ‘‘Methodology: Test network trafﬁc for periodic behavior
using periodograms’’ reviews periodograms and presents the
Walker’s large sample test. Section ‘‘Experimental setup: Eval-
uation and analysis’’ explains the experimental setup and pre-
sents our evaluation and analysis results of applying the test to
several packets traces, and in Section ‘‘Conclusions’’ we give
our conclusions.Background and motivation: Detection of periodic behavior in
botnet C2 communication channels trafﬁc
Since a bot master controls a botnet via command and control
(C2) communication channels. Our approach is to detect a
botnet through the detection of its C2 communication chan-
nels trafﬁc. This technique is effective as it detects bots before
they engage in harmful malicious activities. This is because C2
trafﬁc by itself is harmless, and its detection it will enable the
detection of the bots that are transmitting/receiving it.
The C2 communication channels between bots and the C2
servers are based on either a pull or push mechanism [7].
Depending on the mechanism used, bots are pre-programmed
to contact each other every T seconds to update bot’s data, re-
ceive commands, and send keep-alive messages. This pattern of
behavior is present in bots irrespective of the botnet’s structure
or the communication protocol being used between bots and
the C2 server. This results in having a periodic behavior in
the bot’s trafﬁc over a given transport port number. We note
that in other botnet variants, C2 communication happens
might occur in an aperiodic manner at arbitrary times. We
brieﬂy discuss this issue in Section ‘‘Experimental setup: Eval-
uation and analysis’’.
In our work, we exploit this periodic behavior to detect C2
communication trafﬁc. In addition to our previous works [5,6],
we are aware of a previous study, that exploits the periodic
behavior of botnet C2 trafﬁc to detect bots. In Gu et al. [7],
the host’s trafﬁc autocorrelation function was computed in
the time domain to examine whether the trafﬁc has a periodic
component or not. We, however, work in the frequency do-
main, as it involves less amount of computations, thus is faster
in time. This is done thorough evaluating the periodogram [9]
of the trafﬁc and then applying Walker’s large sample test [10]
to the periodogram’s maximum ordinate to detect periodic
components.
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basic property shared by many botnet variants and is indepen-
dent of the structure (e.g., centralized, P2P) and communica-
tion protocol (e.g., IRC, HTTP) used in the botnet. What is
important is that it does not require a priori knowledge (e.g.,
signatures) of a certain botnet behavior, provided the C2 com-
munication trafﬁc exhibits periodic behavior. We note that
network trafﬁc in general can exhibit periodic behavior. Exam-
ple of this would be an E-mail session that checks periodically
for new messages. This can affect the accuracy of the detection
of C2 trafﬁc by introducing false positives. We address this is-
sue in Section ‘‘Experimental setup: Evaluation and analysis’’.
Approach: Discrete time series analysis of aggregate trafﬁc
To detect botnet C2 communication channels trafﬁc, we apply
discrete time series analysis to study the aggregate trafﬁc
behavior. To accomplish this, we have to extract a discrete
time sequence from a packet trace. This is done by ﬁrst aggre-
gating packets originating from or destined to a given host,
subnet, or network over an appropriate aggregation interval.
Next, we extract a count-feature [8,11] from the packet header
information to produce the discrete time sequence. The basic
count feature is the packet count, which is the number of pack-
ets in that aggregation interval. Other examples of count-fea-
tures include the byte count, which is the total number of
bytes in all of the packets within the aggregation interval,
and the different addresses count, which is the total number
of distinct IP addresses in all of the packets within the aggre-
gation interval. The selection of the aggregation interval is
based on the packet rate of the trafﬁc at the given host, subnet,
or network. A higher packet rate implies using a smaller the
aggregation interval. The objective is to avoid a discrete time
sequence with low variance.
Having packet traces in the form of discrete time sequences
enables applying statistical signal processing methods that are
used in discrete time series analysis. Furthermore, monitoring
aggregate trafﬁc behavior requires keeping track of less details
of the trafﬁc when compared for example to tracking the com-
munication ﬂows of different hosts or examining the content of
individual packets. We acknowledge that tracking less details
of network trafﬁc implies having less knowledge, which might
lead to a lower accuracy in detection and higher false positive
rates, but has several advantages. First, it consumes less com-
putational processing, hence faster analysis in time; both con-
tributing to higher scalability. We emphasize that with the
larger growth in using high bit rate applications in the Internet,
the demand for higher scalability has increased. Second, char-
acterizing malicious activities trafﬁc with less details can lead
to a detection scheme that is more resistant to evasion. This
is because the malicious attacker will have more restrictions
to evade the characterized malicious activity without compro-
mising the efﬁciency of the attack.
Discrete time series analysis of control plane trafﬁc
The above analysis can be also applied to the control plane
trafﬁc packets [8]. Control plane trafﬁc packets as AsSadhan
et. al deﬁne [8] are the packets ‘‘that set, maintain, or tear
down a connection’’. Data plane trafﬁc packets are thosepackets that are involved in the transmission of the actual
data. For TCP packets, we treat a packet as a control plane
packet if it is one of these four types:
(1) SYN packet.
(2) Bare ACK packet, which is an acknowledgment packet
with no payload.
(3) FIN packet.
(4) RST packet.
We apply discrete time series analysis to TCP control plane
trafﬁc due to its similar behavior to the data plane trafﬁc as dis-
cussedpreviously [8]. The reasonbehind this similarity is that the
generation of data trafﬁc is based on the generation of the con-
trol trafﬁc [8]. Therefore, analyzing the control plane trafﬁc only
wemight sufﬁces for analyzing thewhole trafﬁc (i.e., control and
data planes). Such analysis reduces the amount of trafﬁc to look
at, which further implies fewer computations and faster analysis,
both contributing to higher scalability. We note that since UDP
is a connectionless unreliable protocol, the information in a
packet’s UDP header is not sufﬁcient to decide whether to treat
it as a control or data plane packet. Thus, unless we have access
to the packet’s application header and this header has sufﬁcient
information, it is not possible to decompose UDP packets into
control and data planes packets as in the case of TCP.
Methodology: Test network trafﬁc for periodic behavior using
periodograms
We propose to detect periodic behavior in botnet C2 trafﬁc by
analyzing the Power Spectral Density (PSD) of the network
trafﬁc. The PSD can be estimated by taking the Fourier trans-
form of the autocorrelation function. Alternatively, a PSD can
be estimated using periodograms [9]. The periodogram of a
time sequence (signal) provides its power at different frequen-
cies. Periodograms have been used in other areas to detect peri-
odic behavior like in biology [12] and geophysics [13]. It has
also been used to analyze network trafﬁc, see for example [14].
The periodogram is useful to identify frequency compo-
nents that possess high power levels. Therefore, the periodo-
gram of a periodic signal will have a high peak at the
reciprocal of the fundamental period of the signal when com-
pared to the mean of the periodogram. To evaluate the period-
ogram of a given trafﬁc trace, we ﬁrst extract a count-feature
over a selected aggregation interval to produce a discrete time
sequence x[n]. The periodogram Pxx½k of a discrete time se-
quence x[n] is the square magnitude of the Discrete Fourier
Transform (DFT) of the signal evaluated by
Pxx½k ¼ 1
N
jX½kj2;
where
X½k ¼
XN1
n¼0
x½n exp j2pkn
N
 
is the N-point DFT.
Fig. 1 illustrates how periodograms can be used to detect
periodic behavior. The top-left plot shows a periodic train of
rectangular pulses with levels 0 and 1, a period of 0.1 s, a duty
cycle of 20%, and a duration of 1 s. The one sided
0 0.5 1
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
Periodic signal
Time (Sec)
0 50 100
0
2
4
6
Frequency (Hz)
Pe
rio
do
gr
am
0 0.5 1
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
Aperiodic signal
Time (Sec)
0 50 100
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
Frequency (Hz)
Pe
rio
do
gr
am
Fig. 1 Left plots show a periodic train of rectangular pulses with a period of 0.1 s, and its one sided periodogram that consists of a large
peak at the fundamental frequency and smaller peaks at the harmonics. Right plots show an aperiodic signal, and its one sided
periodogram that consists of several small peaks.
1 A binomial random variable is deﬁned as the sum of n independent
identically distributed (i.i.d.) Bernoulli random variables with proba-
bility p.
438 B. AsSadhan and J.M.F. Mouraperiodogram of this periodic signal after subtracting its mean
is shown in the ﬁgure’s bottom-left plot. The periodogram con-
sists of a large peak at 10 Hz, smaller peaks at multiples of
10Hz, which represent the harmonic components, and almost
zero elsewhere. The ﬁgure’s top-right plot shows an aperiodic
Poisson random signal with a variance of 0.16, and a duration
of 1 s. The selection of the variance was made in order to have
it equal to the variance of the square wave signal. The one
sided periodogram of the aperiodic signal after subtracting
its mean is shown in the ﬁgure’s bottom-right plot. It consists
of several peaks; none of them has a signiﬁcantly large value
when compared to the mean of the periodogram.
The periodogram we described above is referred to as the
standard periodogram. We note that we choose not to use
the Welch’s method of averaged periodogram [9,15]. This is be-
cause our work is interested in the detection and estimation of
a single periodic component, which is better achieved using the
standard periodogram as discussed in So et al. [16]. The aver-
aged periodogram is used by others to represent the spectral
density of the trafﬁc [14] and to detect a periodic component
with non-stationary phase [16]. We use however the modiﬁed
periodogram [9]. The modiﬁcation is done by multiplying the
trafﬁc sequence by a Hamming window in order to reduce
the level of the side-lobes. We note that windowing comes at
the cost of reducing the sharpness of the peak.
Detecting the signiﬁcance of the periodogram’s peak
From Fig. 1’s bottom plots, we can see that the periodogram
of any signal whether it is periodic or aperiodic will always
have a peak. Thus, we need to have the ability to decidewhether the peak is signiﬁcant enough when compared to the
rest of the periodogram’s ordinates to declare that the se-
quence contains a periodic component or not. We use binary
hypothesis testing [17,18] to achieve this.
Before setting up the two hypotheses test, we state a basic
assumption we adopt; the count-feature sequence extracted
from the network trafﬁc communication of a given host on a
given port has a Poisson distribution. We acknowledge that
Poisson statistics may or may not be an accurate model for
network trafﬁc at a given host on a given port. We use it to
simplify the analysis. Other exponential family models will af-
fect the threshold selection, but not the test itself.
The Poisson distribution is a good approximation to the
binomial distribution when the binomial parameter n is large
and the binomial parameter p is small1 [19]. A binomial ran-
dom variable with a large n and its Poisson approximation
(when p is small) can be, based on the central limit theorem,
approximated by a Gaussian random variable [19]. Therefore,
the count-feature sequence extracted from the packet trace
after subtracting its mean and normalizing it by its standard
deviation, can be treated as a standard Gaussian distribution
(i.e., N (0, 1)).
We now set up the null hypothesis H0; the count-feature se-
quence x[n] is Gaussian, against the alternative hypothesis H1;
x[n] has a periodic component at some unspeciﬁed frequency
plus Gaussian noise. Under H0, it can be shown that the ordi-
nates Pxx[k0] of the periodogram of x[n] are independent
2 A TinyP2P botnet is a botnet that uses TinyP2P as its communi-
cation protocol [21].
An efﬁcient method to detect periodic behavior in botnet trafﬁc 439identically distributed (i.i.d.) [10]. Each Pxx[k0] has a distribu-
tion that is proportional to a chi-square distribution with two
degrees of freedom [10]. Speciﬁcally,
Pxx½k0=r2x ¼ v22:
Since a chi-square distribution with two degrees of freedom is
equivalent to an exponential distribution with mean 2, it fol-
lows that the probability density function of Pxx½k0=r2x is
fðxÞ ¼ 1
2
expðx=2Þ; 0  x <1
Therefore, for zP 0,
Pr½Pxx½k0=r2x  z ¼
Z z
0
1
2
expðx=2Þdx
¼ 1 expðz=2Þ: ð1Þ
Since we are interested in the periodogram’s ordinate that
has the maximum value, we deﬁne the ratio test statistics,
cx ¼
max0km1ðPxx½kÞ
r2x
: ð2Þ
Since under H0, the periodogram ordinates Pxx[k0] are i.i.d.,
then it follows that, for zP 0,
Pr½cx > z ¼ 1 Pr½cx  z ¼ 1 Pr½ðPxx½k0=r2xÞ
 z; all k0 ¼ 1 ð1 expðz=2ÞÞm; ð3Þ
where m is the number of ordinates at the positive frequencies
of the periodogram.
Eqs. (1)–(3) assume that the variance r2x is known a priori.
However, in practice, it is typically unknown, and an estimate
is used. The variance r2x can be estimated directly from the time
sequence x[n] using the sample variance. But since x[n] might not
be available, it is better to estimate r2x directly from Pxx[k]. The
estimate of r2x according to Priestley [10] can be evaluated by
br2x ¼ 12m
Xm1
k¼0
Pxx½k
The quantity br2x is an unbiased estimate of r2x, and we will use
it in place of r2x in (2) to deﬁne the sample ratio test statistic,
gx ¼
max0km1ðPxx½kÞ
1
2m
Pm1
k¼0 Pxx½k
: ð4Þ
When m is large, br2x will be a good approximation to r2x; thus,
we can treat the denominator of (4) as r2x. Then, g

x will have
the same distribution as cx, and asymptotically under H0 we
have, for zP 0,
Pr½gx > z  1 ð1 expðz=2ÞÞm: ð5Þ
The asymptotic distribution of gx is the basis of Walker’s large
sample test for max (Pxx[k]), [10].
Under the alternative hypothesis H1, where the signal is
periodic, the sample ratio test statistic gx will be large. This en-
ables us to use a one sided test and select the critical region
gx > za, where za is selected so the right hand side of (5) is
equal to a, which represents the false positive probability of
the test. If the calculated value of gx from the sample data is
less than za, we then accept H0, and conclude that x½n does
not have any periodic component. If gx is larger than za, we
then reject H0, with a false positive probability of a and con-
clude that x½n has a periodic component. The value of a isselected based on how small we would like the false positive
probability to be.
We note that Fisher has derived an exact test for
max (Pxx[k]) [10,12,20]. However, we use Walker’s test for
the following reasons: ﬁrst, Fisher’s test involves using combi-
natorial coefﬁcients, which are limited in their accuracy as the
number of sample points gets large; hence we lose the exactness
of the test. Second, even if the number of sample points is not
large, evaluating za in the Fisher test to set the critical region to
a is not straight forward. Instead, we need for each measured
gx to evaluate the probability that it would be greater than this
value, and then check if the probability is smaller than a or
not. Third, usually, we are not short of network trafﬁc to get
a good estimate br2x to use in the denominator of (4).
In Walker’s test described above, when the peak of the peri-
odogram, max (Pxx[k]), is signiﬁcant, we can only declare that
the count-feature sequence has a periodic component at some
frequency f. The question would be can we conclude that the
count-feature sequence has a periodic component with the fre-
quency where max (Pxx[k]) is located. Hartley has answered
the question and showed that the probability that the sequence
has a periodic component at some other frequency f is less than
a, the probability of false positive, [10]. Therefore, when the
peak of the periodogram, max (Pxx[k]), is signiﬁcant, we can
conclude that the count-feature sequence contains a periodic
component with the frequency where max (Pxx[k]) is located.
Experimental setup: Evaluation and analysis
We utilize SLINGbot [21] (System for Live Investigation of
NextGeneration bots) to generate examples of botnet C2 trafﬁc.
The trafﬁc includes downloading bot software, connecting to
botC2 servers, and receiving botnet commands. SLINGbot uses
a C2 feature space that consists of ﬁve separate dimensions for
the functionality of botnets. The ﬁve dimensions are the follow-
ing: topology, rallying mechanism, communication protocol,
control mechanism, and command authentication mechanism.
We use SLINGbot to set three variants of botnets, two
TinyP2P2 and one IRC, which we discuss further in this section.
Periodic behavior in packet and address counts of botnet C2
trafﬁc
We use SLINGbot to set ﬁve bots and one bot master in a
mesh topology; the bots use TinyP2P as its protocol of com-
munication on port number 11375. Each bot is pre-pro-
grammed to update its data every 3 s by contacting other
bots. The experiment was run for approximately 20 s. Since
we notice that the C2 trafﬁc of each of these six bots is similar,
we will only discuss the trafﬁc of one of them. We use an aggre-
gation interval of 100 ms to extract the packet and address
count sequences from the bot’s trafﬁc.
Fig. 2’s top plots show the packet and address count se-
quences of the C2 communication trafﬁc of a TinyP2P bot.
The periodic behavior is apparent in both count sequences.
At the start of each period, each bot contacts other bot to
check whether there are any updates, and if so it downloads
them; after that, it becomes silent until the next period starts.
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Fig. 2 Left plots show the packet count for the C2 communication trafﬁc of TinyP2P bot and its one sided periodogram. Right plots
show the address count for the same trafﬁc and its one sided periodogram. The aggregation interval for the packet and address counts is
100 ms.
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ograms of these count sequences after subtracting their means
and normalizing them by their standard deviations.
In both plots, there is a single major peak at 313 mHz. This
peak corresponds to a period of 3.2 s, which agrees with the 3-
second pre-programmed period of the bot. We also notice that
the peak of the periodogram of the address count sequence has
a higher value than the one of the packet count sequence. This
is due to the number of distinct addresses in the trafﬁc ﬂow,
which has fewer ﬂuctuations when compared to the number
of packets.
We select the false positive probability, a, to be equal to
0.1%. This value is selected since, in general, it is desired to
have a low false positive rate, in particular, in network anom-
aly detection systems. We equate the right hand side of (5) to a,
to get a threshold, z0.1%, of 23.5.
3 We test the signiﬁcance of
the peak, max (Pxx[k]), of the two periodograms by evaluating
the sample ratio test statistic gx in (4) for both periodograms.
The ratio value is found to be 61.7 and 70.7 for the periodo-
gram of the packet and address count sequences, respectively.
Since the two values of gx are larger than z0.1%, we reject the
null hypothesis and conclude that both sequences contain a
periodic component with a frequency of 313 mHz.
The effect of duty cycle on periodic behavior
We use SLINGbot to set another TinyP2P botnet that consists
of ﬁve bots and one bot master. Each of the ﬁve bots is3 The number of ordinates at the positive frequencies of both
periodograms, m, used in evaluating, z0.1% is 128.pre-programmed to update its data with a different period; the
periods that the bots use are 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7 s. The experiment
was run for approximately 35 s. We use an aggregation interval
of 100 ms to extract the packet count of each bot’s trafﬁc.
Fig. 3’s top plots show the packet count sequences of two
TinyP2P bot C2 trafﬁc traces. The periods of the trafﬁc for
the ﬁrst bot (top-left) and the second bot (top-right) are 4
and 6 s, respectively. As can be seen, the periodic behavior is
apparent in both plots. Fig. 3’s bottom plots show the modi-
ﬁed periodograms of the packet sequences after subtracting
their means and normalizing them by their standard devia-
tions. The periodogram of the ﬁrst bot (bottom-left) consists
of a large peak at 273 mHz. This peak corresponds to a period
of 3.7 s, which agrees with the 4-second pre-programmed per-
iod of the bot. The periodogram of the ﬁrst bot also consists of
smaller peaks at the multiples of the frequency. The smaller
peaks are the harmonic components as discussed in Sec-
tion ‘‘Methodology: Test network trafﬁc for periodic behavior
using periodograms’’. The same observations apply to the peri-
odogram of the second bot (bottom-right), except that the
peak is located at 176 mHz, which corresponds to a period
of 5.7 s. Similar to what we get in the ﬁrst TinyP2P botnets,
this period agrees with the 6-second pre-programmed period
of the bot. We test the signiﬁcance of the peak, max (Pxx[k]),
of each of the two periodograms by evaluating the sample ratio
test statistic gx in (4) for each periodogram.
We select the false positive probability, a, to be equal to
0.1%. We equate the right hand side of (5) to a, to get a thresh-
old, z0:1%, of 24.9.
4 We obtain the values of gx for each of the4 The number of ordinates at the positive frequencies of both
periodograms, m, used in evaluating, z0.1% is 256.
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Fig. 3 The top plots show the packet count sequences for the C2 communication channels trafﬁc of two TinyP2P bots with two different
periods. The bottom plots show the one sided periodogram of each sequence. The aggregation interval for the packet count is 100 ms.
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z0:1%. Therefore, we reject the null hypothesis and conclude
that both sequences have a periodic component. We note that
the two reported values of gx in the packet count sequences of
the second TinyP2P botnet C2 trafﬁc traces (101.4 and 77.0)
are higher than the one reported for the packet count of the
ﬁrst TinyP2P botnet C2 trafﬁc traces (61.7). This is because
the second botnet was run for a longer time (35 s), while the
other one was run for a shorter time (20 s). This results in hav-
ing a larger number of periods, which increases the trafﬁc’s
periodogram peak value.
Duty cycle
For a periodic train of pulses, the duty cycle is the ratio of the
pulse duration divided by the period’s length. We note that the
active time duration of the packet count sequences shown in
Fig. 3’s top plots is not affected by the period’s length in the
two bots. Since the ﬁrst bot’s period is smaller than the second
bot’s period, the ﬁrst bot’s trafﬁc duty cycle is higher than the
second bot’s trafﬁc duty cycle. This causes the periodogram
of the ﬁrst bot to have a value of gx (101.4) that is higher than
the value of gx for the second bot (77.0) because the ratio of the
periodogram’s peak to the harmonic components is larger. This
is due to the following fact, which is illustrated in Fig. 4. The
periodogram of a train of rectangular pulses is a sampled
squared sinc function. For trains of rectangular pulses with a
larger duty cycle, the ratio between the main peak and the har-
monic components at the Periodogram is also larger. Hence,
for trains of rectangular pulses with larger duty cycle, the main
peak is more signiﬁcant. Fig. 4’s top-left plot shows a periodic
train of rectangular pulses with a period of 10 s and a duty cycleof 25%. The top-right plot shows a similar periodic train of
rectangular pulses, but with a duty cycle of 50%. The bottom
plots show the periodograms of these two periodic signals after
subtracting their means and normalizing them by their stan-
dard deviations. It can be seen that the periodic signal that
has the higher duty cycle has a higher ratio between the period-
ogram’s main peak and the harmonic components.
Periodic behavior in control plane trafﬁc
We use SLINGbot to set 20 bots and one bot master in a star
topology that uses IRC (Internet Relay Chat) as its protocol of
communication on port number 6667. The bot master is pre-
programmed to broadcast its updates to the 20 bots every
5 s. The experiment was run for approximately 40 s. Since we
notice that the C2 trafﬁc in each of these 21 bots is similar,
we will only analyze the trafﬁc of one of them.
Fig. 5’s top plots show the packet and address count se-
quences for the C2 communication trafﬁc of an IRC bot. As
in the TinyP2P botnets, the periodic behavior is apparent in
both count sequences. The bottom plots in the same ﬁgure
show the modiﬁed periodograms of these sequences after sub-
tracting their means and normalizing them by their standard
deviations. In both plots, there is a single major peak at
195 mHz. This peak corresponds to a period of 5.1 s, which
agrees with the 5-second pre-programmed period of the bot.
As in the TinyP2P bot, the peak, max (Pxx[k]), of the periodo-
gram of the address count has a higher value than the one for
the periodogram of the packet count.
The two values of gx for the packet and address count
sequences of the IRC botnet C2 trafﬁc are 40.8 and 46.2,
0 50 100
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
Periodic signal with duty cycle of 25%
Time (sec)
0 50 100
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
Periodic signal with duty cycle of 50%
Time (sec)
0 500 1000
0
100
200
300
Pe
rio
do
gr
am
Frequency (mHz)
0 500 1000
0
100
200
300
Pe
rio
do
gr
am
Frequency (mHz)
Fig. 4 Left plots show a periodic train of rectangular pulses with a period of 10 s and a duty cycle of 25%, and its one sided
periodogram. Right plots show a periodic train of rectangular pulses with the same period and a duty cycle of 50%, and its one sided
periodogram. The ratio between the periodogram’s main peak and the harmonic components is higher in the periodic signal that has the
higher duty cycle.
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Fig. 5 Left plots show the packet count for the C2 communication trafﬁc of an IRC bot and its one sided periodogram. Right plots show
the address count for the same trafﬁc and its one sided periodogram. The aggregation interval for the packet and address counts is 100 ms.
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Fig. 6 Left plots show the packet count for the control plane of the C2 communication trafﬁc of an IRC bot and its one sided
periodogram. Right plots show the address count for the same trafﬁc and its one sided periodogram. The aggregation interval for the
packet and address counts is 100 ms.
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5
Thus, we can conclude that both sequences contain a periodic
component with a frequency of 195 mHz. However, the two
values are not as large as the ones in the sequences of the
TinyP2P botnet trafﬁc. This makes it easier for the bot master
to hide the periodic behavior of the C2 trafﬁc by adding
background trafﬁc on the same port to bury its C2 trafﬁc,
which we address in Section ‘‘Experimental setup: Evaluation
and analysis’’. The low value of gx is attributed to the low duty
cycle of the count sequence, which resulted in higher harmon-
ics in the frequency domain when compared to the periodo-
gram’s peak.
Control plane trafﬁc
We study at the control plane trafﬁc of the IRC bot C2 trafﬁc.
The plots in Fig. 6 show the packet and address count se-
quences of the IRC bot C2 control plane trafﬁc and their mod-
iﬁed periodograms. The plots look very similar to the ones in
Fig. 5, where the packet and address count sequences are ex-
tracted from the control and data planes trafﬁc trace.
Although the control plane packets in the IRC bot trafﬁc
constitutes 47% of the total number of packets in the control
and data planes trafﬁc, their volume (in bytes) is only 2.3% of
the total size of the control and data planes trafﬁc packets.
Monitoring this much smaller trafﬁc reduces signiﬁcantly the
processing time and effort. The impact of only monitoring
the control plane trafﬁc is reducing on the value of gx from5 The number of ordinates at the positive frequencies of both
periodograms, m, used in evaluating , z0.1% is 256.40.8 to 35.7 in the case of the packet count sequence and from
46.2 to 34.9. Both values are still clearly larger than
z0.1% = 24.9.
Periodic behavior in the presence of background trafﬁc
A bot master can attempt to evade the detection of its botnet
members by hiding the periodic behavior of the C2 trafﬁc.
This can be done in two ways; ﬁrst, the bot master can carry
the C2 communication channel session over a common port
number used by other Internet applications (e.g., HTTP on
port 80). This will decrease the percentage of C2 trafﬁc’s vol-
ume over this port; hence, its periodic behavior may not be
noticeable. Alternatively, the bot master can program the
trafﬁc over a pre-determined randomized sequence of port
numbers instead of having the C2 trafﬁc between different
bots over a single port number. Such evasion schemes might
prevent the detection of the periodic behavior of a bot’s C2
trafﬁc by relying on monitoring the trafﬁc of a host per trans-
port port numbers.
In this section, we check whether we can continue to detect
the periodic behavior of the C2 trafﬁc of a given bot in the pres-
ence of background trafﬁc. We use the packet traces collected
by the Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory/ International
Computer Science Institute (LBNL/ICSI) Enterprise Tracing
Project [22,23] as our background trafﬁc. The packet traces
were collected from two internal network locations at LBNL.
LBNL is a research institute in the USA with a medium-sized
enterprise network. Only packet header information is released
to the public.
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Fig. 7 The packet (top) and address (bottom) count sequences for three HTTP trafﬁc traces in the LBNL/ICSI data set.
444 B. AsSadhan and J.M.F. MouraWe use the HTTP trafﬁc from the LBNL/ICSI packet trace
as our background trafﬁc, y[n]. We then add it to the C2 trafﬁc
of a TinyP2P bot, x[n]. The total trafﬁc becomes
z½n ¼ x½n þ y½n;
and the resulting ratio gz becomes noisy.
6 We use the Sig-
nal-to-Noise Ratio (SNR) to quantify the level of background
trafﬁc added. The SNR is the ratio of the power of the count-
feature sequence of the botnet C2 trafﬁc after subtracting its
mean to the power of the count-feature sequence of the back-
ground trafﬁc after subtracting its mean. In other words, the
SNR is the ratio of the variances of the two sequences. The fol-
lowing formula is used to evaluate the SNR in dB:
SNR ¼ 10 log r^
2
x
r^2y
¼ 10 log
1
N
PN1
n¼0 ðx½n  l^xÞ2
1
N
PN1
n¼0 ðy½n  l^yÞ2
;
where N is the number of sample points of x[n] and y[n].
Fig. 7’s plots show the packet (top) and address (bottom)
count sequences for three HTTP trafﬁc traces at port 80 in
the LBNL/ICSI data set. The three traces were collected on
October, 4, 2004. The IP addresses of the hosts that generated
the trafﬁc along with the start times (in PDT) of the trafﬁc
traces are as follows: HTTP 1 trafﬁc: (131.243.86.124,
1:46:12 pm), HTTP 2 trafﬁc: (131.243.125.239, 1:25:05), and
HTTP 3 trafﬁc (131.243.219.252, 2:53:02 pm). We note that
the trafﬁc of the three hosts get more bursty as we go to the
right of the ﬁgure, speciﬁcally when we look at the packet
count sequences. We add the trafﬁc of each of these three hosts
to the C2 trafﬁc of the TinyP2P bot shown in Fig. 2 to observe
the effect of this on the sample ratio test statistic gz .
Fig. 8’s plots show the packet and address count sequences
for the TinyP2P bot C2 trafﬁc after adding the HTTP 1 trafﬁc
trace to it. The periodic behavior is still apparent in both plots
and the period is still found to be 3.2 s. The periodic behavior
can also be noticed from the modiﬁed periodograms that are6 We treat the background trafﬁc here as noise trafﬁc.plotted in the bottom plots in the same ﬁgure after subtracting
their means and normalizing them by their standard devia-
tions, where a distinguished peak is still located at the fre-
quency of the sequences at 313 mHz. However, the two
values of gz for the packet and address count sequences of
the total trafﬁc (botnet C2 and background trafﬁc) are less
than the ones we had for gx in the absence of background traf-
ﬁc. In the case of the packet count, the value has decreased
from 61.7 to 54.1, and in the case of the address count, it de-
creased from 70.7 to 57.7. Both values are still higher than
z0.1% (23.5), hence, the test declares both sequences to have a
periodic component. The two values of gz are still high because
the background trafﬁc had a low variance of, which resulted in
a high SNR of 8.3 dB and 7.3 dB in the packet and address
count sequences, respectively.
The case is different when we add either the HTTP 2 or
HTTP 3 trafﬁc traces to the TinyP2P bot C2 trafﬁc as shown
in Figs. 9 and 10. The periodic behavior is no longer apparent
in the top plots of both the packet and address count se-
quences. This is due to the bursty nature of the HTTP 2 and
HTTP 3 trafﬁc traces that resulted in a low SNR. When adding
HTTP 2 trafﬁc, the SNR values are 9.2 dB and 1.3 dB for
the packet count sequence and B the address count sequences,
respectively. When adding HTTP 3 trafﬁc, the SNR values
are9.8 dB and 1.3 dB for the packet count sequence and ad-
dress count sequences, respectively. We make a note of the
large difference in the SNR values between the packet and ad-
dress count sequences. The very low SNR values in the packet
count sequences cause the values of gz to reach 21.4 and 14.6
when we add the HTTP 2 trafﬁc and HTTP 3 trafﬁc, respec-
tively. Both values are lower than z0.1% (23.5), hence, the test
declares that the packet count sequences do not have a peri-
odic component.
Contrary to the SNR values in the packet count sequences,
they are not that low in the address count sequences. They only
cause the values of gz to reach 46.6 and 49.5 when we add the
HTTP 2 trafﬁc and HTTP 3 trafﬁc, respectively. Both values
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Fig. 8 The packet and address count sequences with their one sided periodograms of the C2 communication trafﬁc of the TinyP2P bot
shown in Fig. 2 with the HTTP 1 trafﬁc shown in Fig. 7 added to it. The aggregation interval for the packet and address counts is 100 ms.
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Fig. 9 The packet and address count sequences with their one sided periodograms of the C2 communication trafﬁc of the TinyP2P bot
shown in Fig. 2 with the HTTP 2 trafﬁc shown in Fig. 7 added to it. The aggregation interval for the packet and address counts is 100 ms.
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Fig. 10 The packet and address count sequences with their one sided periodograms of the C2 communication trafﬁc of the TinyP2P bot
shown in Fig. 2 with the HTTP 3 trafﬁc shown in Fig. 7 added to it. The aggregation interval for the packet and address counts is 100 ms.
446 B. AsSadhan and J.M.F. Mouraare still signiﬁcantly higher than z0.1% (23.5), hence, the test de-
clares that the address count sequences have a periodic compo-
nent. The periodic behavior can also be seen from the modiﬁed
periodograms that are plotted in the bottom-right plots in
Figs. 9 and 10 after subtracting their means and normalizing
them by their standard deviations, where a distinguished peak
is located at 313 mHz. We explain the reason behind the differ-
ent observations between the packet and address count se-
quences. This is because of the fact that the number of
distinct addresses (i.e., hosts) that a given host communicates
with during a given aggregation interval is much smaller than
the number of packets it would send/receive from these hosts.
This makes address count sequences more robust to evasion
schemes than packet count sequences.
The previous plots show the effect of adding the trafﬁc of a
single HTTP connection to a bot’s C2 trafﬁc. To examine the
effect of adding the trafﬁc of multiple HTTP connections to a
bot’s trafﬁc, we add all of the three HTTP trafﬁc traces to the
C2 trafﬁc trace. The results are shown Fig. 11’s plots. The re-
sult we ﬁnd in the packet count sequences is similar to the one
we get after adding either the HTTP 2 or HTTP 3 trafﬁc traces
individually; i.e., the trafﬁc trace no longer exhibits periodic
behavior due to the low SNR. In the case of the address count
sequences, the SNR is 4.3 dB, which is (in absolute value)
half of the SNR value (1.3 dB) when either the HTTP 2 or
HTTP 3 trafﬁc traces were added. The SNR value of
4.3 dB causes the value of gz to reach 35.8, which is still high-
er than z0.1% (23.5); hence, the test declares that the sequence
has a periodic component. The periodic behavior can be seen
from the modiﬁed periodograms that are plotted in the bot-
tom-right plot in Fig. 11 after subtracting their means and nor-
malizing them by their standard deviations, where a
distinguished peak is located at 313 mHz.To summarize, the detection of periodic behavior in botnet
C2 trafﬁc in the presence of background trafﬁc depends on the
count-feature sequence we test. In the case of packet count se-
quences, the test detects the periodic behavior down to a cer-
tain SNR level; below that level, it fails to detect the periodic
behavior. We note that the results of adding background traf-
ﬁc to packet count sequences are similar to the results of
AsSadhan et. al [6] when random noise trafﬁc was injected.
In the case of address count sequences, the test is much more
robust to the background trafﬁc and succeeds in detecting the
periodic behavior. This is because of the fact that the number
of distinct addresses (i.e., hosts) that a given host communi-
cates with during a given aggregation interval is much smaller
than the number of packets it would send/receive from these
hosts. This illustrates that address count sequences are more
robust to background trafﬁc than packet count sequences.Method’s limitations
We address some of the limitations of basing the detection of
botnet C2 communication trafﬁc on the detection of its peri-
odic behavior. The bot master can attempt to hide the periodic
behavior of its bots by uniformly randomizing the period with-
in a certain small range. This can be modeled by a random
phase. The detectability of the periodic behavior here will de-
pend on how large the random phase is and on the period’s
length and the duty cycle. In case the bot master uses a larger
range, such that the signal is no longer periodic, it will succeed
in evading our test. However, such evasion scheme will limit
the effectiveness of the exchange of C2 channel trafﬁc between
different bots. This will result in not having C2 updates at
pre-determined times, which might disturb the effectiveness
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Fig. 11 The packet and address count sequences with their one sided periodograms of the C2 communication trafﬁc of the TinyP2P bot
shown in Fig. 2 with all of the three HTTP trafﬁc trace shown in Fig. 7 added to it. The aggregation interval for the packet and address
counts is 100 ms.
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certain applications that have a periodic nature. The trafﬁc
of these applications can introduce false positives, however,
they can be easily white listed once we are aware of them.
Alternatively, the output trafﬁc of the test can be tested further
using a more complex method to determine whether the ob-
served periodic behavior is due to botnet C2 trafﬁc or not.
We note that such complex method might not scale up if ap-
plied directly to the original trafﬁc trace. Therefore, our meth-
od can serve as a scalable ﬁrst stage.
Conclusions
We propose a method that detects periodic behavior in net-
work trafﬁc. The method starts with the evaluation if the peri-
odogram of the trafﬁc sequence and then it locates its peak.
After that, it uses Walker’s large sample test to determine
whether the periodogram’s peak is signiﬁcant when compared
to the rest of the periodogram’s ordinates or not. If it is deter-
mined to be signiﬁcant, it declares the presence of a periodic
component whose frequency is where the peak is located.
We use this method to detect botnet command and control
(C2) channels trafﬁc by detecting their periodic behavior. Peri-
odic behavior arises in botnet C2 trafﬁc since in many botnet
variants bots are pre-programmed to check for and download
updates every T seconds. We generate two variants of botnet
C2 communication trafﬁc using SLINGbot, TinyP2P and
IRC. We apply Walker’s large sample test to the C2 trafﬁc
and show that the trafﬁc in both botnets exhibits periodic behav-
ior in Figs. 2 and 3 and 5 and 6. The periodic behavior was also
detected when analyzing the control plane trafﬁc only. Since thevolume of control plane trafﬁc is much smaller, monitoring it
will considerably reduce the processing time and effort.
We examine the effect of the duty cycle, length of observed
trafﬁc, and period length of the C2 trafﬁc on the test perfor-
mance. We show that the test’s performance increases with
the increase in the duty cycle and/or the length of the observed
trafﬁc, and decreases with the decrease in the period length.
We study cases where the bot master attempts to evade the
detection of the periodic behavior of C2 trafﬁc by mixing it
with HTTP background trafﬁc. Our results show that, depend-
ing on the count-feature that is being tested, periodic behavior
can still be detected. When testing the packet count sequence,
periodic behavior is detected up to a certain packet volume le-
vel; above that level, periodic behavior is no longer detected.
When testing the address count sequence, the test is much
more robust and succeeds in detecting the periodic behavior.
This is due to the fact that the number of hosts that a given
host communicates with during a given aggregation interval
is much smaller than the number of packets it sends/receives
from these hosts.Conﬂict of interest
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